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Has Tax Competition Been Curbed? Reaction to
L. Ahrens, L. Hakelberg & T. Rix.en
Reuven Avi-Yonah •

(a) The Role of FATCA.

This excellent article shows that contrary to the dire
predictions of many observers, tax cooperation is still
possible among OECD member countries and that such
cooperation can overcome the trilernrna of maintaining
democracy, sustaining globalization and accepting some
tax competition. Spe<:ifically, the authors show that in
the realm of individual tax evasion, the advent of
Automatic Exchange of Information (AEol) after the
financial crisis of 2008-9 has enabled OECD countries
to maintain a higher level of tax on capital than was
possible before the crisis. This, in turn, enabled such
countries to reduce inequality and maintain the social
safety net while retaining the ability to democratically

The authors state that:
After the Group of 20 (G20) declared the end of bank
ing secrecy in 2009, the OECD implemented increas
ingly stringent reforms of its standards for
administrative assistance in tax matters, culminating
in the multilateral adoption of the automatic exchange
2
of information (AEol) in 2014.
What is left unclear is how this remarkable consensus was
achieved. While it is true that the financial crisis of 2008-9
played an important role, in my opinioo the key development
was the adop<ion of FATCA by the US in 2010. Under
FATCA, foreign financial institutions (FFis) had to collect
information of accountS held directly or indirectly by US
citizens or residents and transmit this information to the
IRS, or else fact a withholding tax of 30% on their US source
income. Since the laws in many countries prevented the FFis
from complying, the Obama administration negotiated over
100 Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) under which the
FFls could provide the relevant information to their home
government for transmittal to the IRS. The FFis, in tum,
developed the CRS to be able to comply with FATCA, and
that was the development char made AEoI possible. 3
The key lesson from this is that the multilateral con
sensus on AEol would not have happened but for the
unilateral intervention by the US. Despite world-wide
condemnation of FATCA as an extraterritorial power
grab by the US, espe<:ially in regard to US citizens living
permanently overseas, in my opinion this was a classic
example of what I call 'constructive unilateralism', in
which a unilateral move by one important country
enables a multilateral consensus co form. The history of

set cax rates and avoiding controls on the free flow of
capital. The authors correctly contrast this development
with the failure so far to achieve consensus on taxing
corporate profits, so that the trilemma persists in regard
1
co that type of capital.
I have four comments:
{l) The authors do not clarify sufficiently what led
the OECD to adopt AEol and the underlying
Common Reporting Standard (CRS). In my opi
nion, the driving force was the US adoption of the
Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)
in 2010;
(2) The focus on statutory rax rates and on dividends
can be misleading;
(3) There are promising developments regarding rax
transparency in the US that should be taken into
account;
(4) The aurhors' prognosis for taxing corporations may
be too gloomy, given recent developmencs in the
US, the EU and India.
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lntertax
international taxation is full of such developme nts,
usually in response to unilateral US moves: The foreign
tax credit, Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules ,
and transfer pricing rules are j ust some examples of US
unilateral developments that were copied by other coun
4
tries (and not just by OECD members}.

anonymous trusts. The EU should pressure the US into
participating in reciprocal AEol in the near future. 8

The problem is that statutory rates can be m islead ing
because what matters to both taxpayers and governments
are effective rates (how much tax is actually paid), not
statutory rates. In the US there is a large gap between
high statutory rates and low effective rates, especially on
6
the rich. Moreover, the focus on dividends is also some
what misleading (and driven entirely by data availability},
because most cross-border payments are not dividends
(that are general ly subject to withholding taxes} but capi
7
tal gai ns and interest (which are not). Thus, 1 believe it
would be better in the future to focus on whether res i
dence countries can in fact tax foreign source interest and
capital gains of their residents , and to focus on the effec
tive tax rate, not the Statutory rate:

This statement is a bit out of date, because the US recently
(over president Tmmp's veto, with high bipartisan coopera
tion) adopted the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA),
which creates a beneficial ownership registry within the
US Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), requiring millions of
'reporting companies' to report information on their 'ben
eficial owners' to FinCEN. The purpose of the registry is to
crack down on anonymous shell companies, which have
long been the vehicle of choice for money launderers,
terrorists, and criminals. The CTA creates a first-of-its
kind comprehensive US data base that will improve the
ability of law enforcement to combat money laundering,
the financing of terrorism, and other illicit activiry. 9
This new development and the advent of the Biden
administration are encouraging , Under the IGAs, the US is
supposed to provide information on a reciprocal basis, and
while this falls short ofAEoI, the CTA should enable the US
government to obtain much more relevant information.
Moreover, under current US law, the Secretary of the
Treasury is authorized to impose a withholding tax of
30% on portfolio interest paid to any country whose
exchange of information with the US is inadequate 'to
prevent evasion of the United States income tax by United
10
States persons' . If the EU could be persuaded ro adopt a
similar rule (as opposed to applying the Savings Directive
only to intra-EU payments), this can be a significant step
toward curing tax evasion:

(c) The US and Tax Transparency.

(d) The Furure of Corporate Taxation .

(b) The Focus on Statutory Rates on Dividends.
The authors state that:
Our research focuses on the net tax rate on dividends at
the shareholder level because of the availability of a
long time-series covering all OECD member states.
Recent OECD research suggests, however, that average
tax rates on capital gains and interest have also
5
increased between 20 1 2 and 2 0 1 6.

The authors state that:

The authors stare rhat-

The second problem is that while the coverage of the
AEoI regime is high, several j urisdictions are still reluc
tant to joi n threatening the future success of the AEoI.
Most importantly, the United States does not share
equivalent information with foreign jurisdictions. This
is especially worrisome because the US is the largest
financial center in the world . It has both an i ncentive
and the possibility to develop tax haven operations in the
future. Banks in states such as Delaware, Nevada, or
South Dakota already allow foreign investors to establish

Fi nally, a return to a truly progressive tax system
hinges on effective cooperation regarding corporate
taxation. However, to date, no breakthrough compar
able to AEoI has been achieved. Political pressure to
move forward on this front should therefore be upheld.
Whereas new rules for the taxation of digital services
are a good first step in this regard, replacing separate
entity accounting and the arm's length standard with
unitary taxation seems to be rhe most ambitious but
11
also the most promising way forward.
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Has Tax Competition Been Curbed?
I agree. I would highlight some important developments
in this regard. First, the US is likely to increase its
corporate tax on foreign subsidiaries of US multinationals
12
to 21 % , as proposed by the Biden administration.
Second, under the EU Ami-Tax Avoidance Directive
(ATAD), all EU Member States must impose a minimum
tax on the foreign subsidiaries of their multinationals at
40% of the domestic corporate tax rate (for Germany rhat
13
would be 40% of 30%, or 12%).
Finally, India has
proposed a unilateral move to global formulary apportion
ment, i.e., taking the multinational's global profit ratio

and allocating it to India based on a three-factor formula
(tangible assets, payroll and sales). Because this does not
require cooperation, it may be copied by other countries,
just like digital services taxes began in the UK and were
14
copied by over thirty coumries.
Under these conditions, a multilateral agreement on a
minimum corporate tax under the auspices of the OECD
is not impossible ro imagine. But such an agreement is
not needed, because all of the above steps are unilateral.
Therefore, a higher effective rate on corporate profits is
like!y in the near future .

...
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